IDX e-IPO Analytics
IDX · 2021–2026BACH
IndustrialsControl onlyCheap (~10-13x P/E for ~100% profit growth, 29% ROE) vs JEC's 53-62x; discount prices cyclicality, leverage, concentration, related-party governance, no-MTO control transfer
Small-house franchise focused on micro-cap / nascent-board listings (deal sizes ~Rp66-207bn). Across the three confirmed Erdikha-led IPOs (SMKM, VAST, GRIA) post-listing performance is weak-to-mixed: SMKM is ~-69% and a dead penny stock; VAST and GRIA touched gocap-area lows before recovering to around/slightly above offer. Two co-underwritten 2024 deals (TOSK, MEJA) show textbook pump-then-crater behavior.
How each axis scores
- Revenue growth (FY25)39.7%82
- Net-profit growth (FY25)97.5%88
- Gross margin (FY25)18.0%41
- Net margin (FY25)9.0%64
- ROE (FY25)29.0%91
- Net-margin trend (3-yr)4%→9%71
- Profit consistency (3-yr)3/3 yrs profitable90
- Earnings qualityclean / cash-like78
- P/E (post-money)11.8×81
- P/B (post-money)2.25×69
- Analyst verdictCheap (~10-13x P/E for ~100% profit growth, 29% ROE) vs JEC's 53-62x; discount prices cyclicality, leverage, concentration, related-party governance, no-MTO control transfer85
- Leverage (DER, FY25)1.30×64
- DER post-IPO (est.)0.75×81
- Proceeds to debt repay33%61
- Underwriter track recordErdikha Elit Sekuritas (C)50
- Shareholder compositionconglomerate-linked · 3 holders ≥5% · top 52%47
- Liquidity & deal sizeRp1.8T mcap · 15% float70
- Deal structureControl only58
- Red / green flag balance6 green / 9 red42
Each axis is a 0–100 blend of the inputs shown; the headline is their weighted mean (Fundamentals 30 · Valuation 22 · Balance sheet 16 · Governance & sponsor 32). Margins, ROE and valuation multiples are scored half on absolute bands, half against sector / cohort peers; earnings quality discounts one-off / non-operating profit. Deterministic and auditable — educational only, not a recommendation. See disclaimer.
Business model
p.63–64, 70, 171–185
Two segments: sale & rental of gensets (sole Indonesian agent for Himoinsa) and telecom-infrastructure construction & maintenance (towers, fiber, O&M of ~41,000 sites) via subsidiary BMI.
| Genset (sale & rental) | 56.4% | Rp 978.0B |
| Telecom-infrastructure (construction & maintenance) | 43.6% | Rp 755.0B |
Genset segment sells units (7–3,000 kVA) with installation and after-sales, and rents a fleet under medium/long-term contracts. Telecom-infra (BMI) does site acquisition, CME tower build and fiber, plus recurring SLA-based maintenance and backup power. The genset segment more than doubled in FY2025 (was only ~36% of FY2024 revenue), flipping the mix to genset-majority.
Ownership & cap table
Pre-IPO → Post-IPO → Post-option
| Holder | Pre % | Post % | Opt % | Shares |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PT Global Telekomunikasi PrimaConglomerate | 30.0% | 25.5% | 51.0% | 2,083,059,300 |
| PT Bach Multi Sukses Investama | 61.5% | 52.3% | 26.8% | 1,093,268,700 |
| Masyarakat (Public) | — | 15.1% | 15.1% | 615,000,000 |
| Budi Kurniawan | 2.0% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 69,600,000 |
| Hartanto Rahardja | 1.8% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 62,400,000 |
| Edy Surianto | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 55,200,000 |
| Zulfahmi Fithri | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 53,102,000 |
| Hasby Jap | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 52,800,000 |
BACH wraps a genset/telecom-infra business around a control hand-over from the founding Bach family (BMSI) to the Hartono family (Djarum / BCA / GDP Venture) via GTP, which steps from 25.5% at listing to 51% through a pre-agreed post-listing option structured to avoid a mandatory tender offer. The Hartono UBOs also control listed tower group TOWR and Protelindo, which is simultaneously BACH's largest customer (~14-40% of revenue), so a large slice of revenue becomes related-party post-listing.
- Conglomerate control transfer to the Hartono/Djarum group via a GTP option (25.5% to 51%), structured to assert no mandatory tender offer for minorities
- Chair (Komut Anita Anwar) is concurrently VP Director of Protelindo, Director of TOWR and Komut of listed REMALA, sitting on both sides of BACH's largest customer relationship
- ~14-40% of revenue becomes related-party (Protelindo / TOWR group) after the acquisition
- Only 1 of 3 commissioners is independent (33%, bare minimum); float sits at the 15.06% regulatory floor
Structural facts from public-source research; items marked Unverified are unproven (dated allegations or possible namesakes) and may be wrong. Not findings of wrongdoing; see disclaimer.
Use of proceeds
→ debt 29.6–37.0%
Financials
FY2023 – FY2025 · IDR
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 1.0T | Rp 1.2T | Rp 1.7T |
| Gross profit | Rp 160.8B | Rp 198.0B | Rp 311.4B |
| Gross margin | 16.0% | 16.0% | 18.0% |
| Net profit (parent) | Rp 34.3B | Rp 78.7B | Rp 155.5B |
| Net margin | 3.5% | 6.3% | 9.0% |
| Total assets | Rp 680.3B | Rp 815.6B | Rp 1.2T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 308.5B | Rp 381.6B | Rp 696.7B |
| Total equity | Rp 371.8B | Rp 434.0B | Rp 536.0B |
| DER (total) | 0.83× | 0.88× | 1.30× |
| ROE | 9.5% | 18.1% | 29.0% |
| FY25 YoY | rev +39.7% · net profit +97.5% | ||
Valuation & leverage
- Trailing P/E
- 10.5–13.1×
- P/BV (post-money)
- 2.1–2.4×
- Post-IPO mkt cap
- Rp 1.6T – Rp 2.0T
- ROE post-money
- 19.1%
- DER FY25 → post-IPO
- 1.30× → 0.75×
- Dividend policy
- Post-IPO up to 50% payout of net profit, starting 2027 from 2026 earnings
Red flags
9 flagged
- Concurrent control transfer to Hartono (GTP->51%) with NO mandatory tender offer (MTO-avoidance via 'GTP already controller' resolution 8 Jan 2026) - no control-premium exit for minorities
- Related-party concentration: #1 customer Protelindo (Hartono/TOWR) 14-40% of revenue becomes related party; chair on both sides
- Debt-funded growth on thin cash: DER 1.30x, Rp11.97bn cash vs Rp595bn current liabilities, Rp369.7bn fleet capex outran CFO
- Control sale (BMSI->GTP, Rp417-521bn) larger than IPO raise; IPO book sets Bach family's exit price
- Supplier dependency (stated #1 risk) - reliance on Chinese genset suppliers; FX/supply-chain exposure
- Cyclical growth - 2025 genset surge tied to data-centre/tower capex cycle; reversible
- Pre-IPO dividend Rp129.1bn (2023) = ~3.6x that year's net profit
- Governance thinness - only 1 independent commissioner; conflicted chair; no ESA/ESOP
- Thin 15.06% float + concentrated register = low liquidity, minimal minority influence
Green flags
6 positives
- Cheap valuation: ~10-13x trailing P/E for ~100% profit growth and 29% ROE
- Deep-pocketed Hartono controller brings capital strength and captive demand (TOWR / Protelindo / data centres)
- Growth-oriented use of proceeds (~70% funds revenue-generating genset inventory and rental fleet)
- Positive and growing operating cash flow (Rp132bn in 2025)
- Structural demand tailwind from data-centre, telecom-tower and electrification build-out
- Clean legal record across company, subsidiary, directors and commissioners
Questions before you subscribe
8 questions
Tailwind. Indonesia data-centre / telecom-tower / electrification build-out drives genset (sale + rental) demand
- Option strike price (set after bookbuilding) - at/above/below IPO price?
- Basis for GTP's pre-existing 'controller' status at 30% (board control / shareholders' agreement / OJK confirmation of no-MTO)
- Forward related-party framework with TOWR/Protelindo (transfer pricing, independent review, caps)
- Exact interest-bearing debt at 31 Dec 2025 (Permata + SMBC) for clean financial DER / net debt
- Sustainability of genset-segment growth (backlog, fleet utilisation, data-centre pipeline, one-offs)
- Issuance cost % (confirm in final prospectus)
- POJK 25/2017 lock-up tension - does Feb-2026 par-price cash subscription (Zulfahmi Fithri) fall inside the 6-month pre-registration window?
- Durability of Protelindo MSA (6 May 2025) and SUPR contracts
Full forensic writeupclick to expand
Thesis
BACH (PT BACH Multi Global Tbk) is a fast-growing, cheaply-priced genset and telecom-infrastructure company whose IPO is wrapped around a control hand-over from the founding Bach family (via holding company BMSI) to the Hartono family (via PT Global Telekomunikasi Prima, GTP). The listing itself raises Rp246.0bn–Rp307.5bn in primary capital, but it sits on top of a larger, parallel transaction: a pre-agreed option that lifts GTP from 30% to 51% within five working days of listing, structured to avoid a mandatory tender offer. The investable question is not who controls BACH — clearly the Hartono group post-listing — but whether the new controller runs it for all shareholders or as a captive vendor to its tower empire. The economics for minorities hinge on whether you trust the Hartono ecosystem to feed BACH on arm's-length terms, and on a stock that prices in real cyclical, leverage, and governance risk at roughly 10–13x trailing earnings.
How the business works
BACH operates two lines: genset (generator) sale and rental, which generated 56.4% of 2025 revenue, and telecom-infrastructure construction and maintenance through its 99.99% subsidiary PT Bach Multi Infrastruktur (est. 2019), at 43.6%. This is a capital-intensive trading and rental model: the company imports gensets (notably from Guangdong Westinpower, China) and either sells them or deploys them into a rental fleet, while the infra arm builds and maintains telecom-tower sites. Two dependencies define the business. First, supply: the prospectus names reliance on Chinese genset suppliers as its top risk, carrying FX and supply-chain exposure. Second, customer concentration: BACH's demand is anchored to a handful of tower clients — chiefly Protelindo (TOWR group) and PT Solusi Tunas Pratama (IDX: SUPR) — each around 14% of 2025 revenue, with Protelindo having been as high as 40% in 2024. Crucially, Protelindo belongs to the same Hartono group taking control, so a meaningful slice of revenue converts into related-party revenue post-listing. The demand backdrop is genuinely supportive: Indonesia's data-centre, telecom-tower, and electrification build-out is driving genset demand, and 2025's surge was almost entirely a genset-rental story tied to that capex cycle — powerful now, but cyclical and supplier-dependent.
The offering & ownership
The IPO is 615,000,000 new shares (15.06% of post-IPO capital), all primary, with no secondary tranche — so every rupiah of the Rp246.0bn–Rp307.5bn gross raise accrues to the company. Pricing is Rp400–Rp500, implying a post-IPO market cap of roughly Rp1.63tn–Rp2.04tn on 4,084,430,000 shares. The float sits at the 15.06% regulatory floor even though the RUPS authorised up to 25%, making the thin liquidity a deliberate choice (and a stated investment risk). The signature structural feature is the option: on 7 January 2026 GTP and BMSI signed an irrevocable option, and on 13 March 2026 GTP gave notice to exercise, buying 1,042,227,300 BMSI shares via a negotiated-market crossing within five working days of listing (around 14 July 2026). That control sale is worth roughly Rp417bn–Rp521bn — larger than the entire IPO raise — and its strike is set after bookbuilding, meaning the same book that prices the public's shares also prices the Bach family's exit. BMSI does not fully exit; it retains 26.77%, so this is a control sale, not a clean exit, leaving the public's 15.06% beneath a 51% Hartono controller and a 26.77% Bach legacy holder. On lock-up: the prospectus asserts no POJK 25/2017 eight-month lock-up applies (claiming no shareholder acquired shares below the IPO price in the six months before registration — worth verifying against a February 2026 par-price cash subscription by Zulfahmi Fithri); the only contractual lock is GTP's own declaration (13 April 2026) not to relinquish control for at least 12 months after effectiveness. The five Bach founders are unlocked, and there is no ESA or ESOP.
Governance & related parties
The defining governance issue is related-party concentration converging with board interlock. The incoming ultimate beneficial owners are named in the prospectus as Martin Basuki Hartono and Victor Rachmat Hartono (Hartono family — Djarum / BCA / GDP Venture), whose group also controls Sarana Menara Nusantara (IDX: TOWR) and Protelindo, and whose orbit includes SUPR as a cross-readable listed tower peer. BACH's chair, Komut Anita Anwar, is concurrently VP Director of Protelindo, Director of TOWR, and Komut of Remala Abadi (IDX: REMALA) — meaning the chair sits on both sides of BACH's largest customer relationship. Post-acquisition, roughly 14–40% of revenue becomes related-party revenue: analytically, this cuts both ways as captive demand (a potential moat) versus transfer-pricing exposure for minorities. The board carries only one independent commissioner of three (33%), meeting the 30% floor with no margin of safety, while Bach founders retain operating roles for management continuity as the Hartono group takes economic control. The most contested point is the mandatory-tender-offer question: the prospectus states the option exercise does not trigger an MTO under POJK 9/2018 because GTP was already "the controller" — a status established by shareholder resolution (Akta No. 32) on 8 January 2026, one day after the option agreement, when GTP held only 30% against BMSI's 61.55%. As analysis, designating a 30% holder as controller days before exercising to 51% is a recognised but aggressive structure that denies public minorities a tender-offer exit at the control price; the harm is limited if the stock holds at or above the IPO price but becomes real if it trades below. The legal record is otherwise clean — neither the company, its subsidiary, nor its directors and commissioners are party to any legal dispute.
Reading the financials
The trajectory is the inverse of a tired business. Revenue grew roughly 73% over two years to Rp1.73tn in 2025 (+39.66%), gross margin expanded to 18.0%, and net profit compounded from Rp35.4bn (2023) to Rp155.6bn (2025) — up about 340% — lifting net margin to 9.0% and ROE to 29.02%. Non-controlling interest is negligible, so attributable profit roughly equals total. The growth driver is genset, not telecom: genset revenue more than doubled to Rp978.0bn (+117%) in 2025 while telecom-infra revenue slipped slightly, so the thesis is effectively a genset-rental cyclical bet tied to tower and data-centre capex. The cost of that growth shows on the balance sheet. 2025 capex of Rp369.7bn (the rental fleet) nearly quadrupled non-current assets to Rp465bn and was funded largely by Rp206bn of net new borrowing, pushing total-liabilities DER to 1.30x and leaving only Rp11.97bn of year-end cash against Rp595bn of current liabilities. Operating cash flow is positive and improving (Rp132bn) but is dwarfed by the fleet spend — as analysis, this is a company outrunning its own cash flow: fine while demand is hot, dangerous if the genset cycle turns, and the IPO equity is precisely what relieves the squeeze. A pro-forma de-lever to roughly 0.75x is plausible after the raise and the Rp91bn revolver repayment, but it is a labelled estimate (a clean interest-bearing DER needs the Permata-plus-SMBC bank-debt detail) and BACH will likely re-lever to keep buying gensets. One pattern worth stating plainly: cash dividends of Rp129.1bn in 2023 — about 3.6x that year's net profit, funded from retained earnings — drained accumulated earnings to the Bach owners shortly before bringing in GTP and the public.
Valuation
On a post-money, attributable basis, BACH prices at roughly 10.5x trailing FY2025 earnings at Rp400 and 13.1x at Rp500 (EPS basis around Rp38.08), with P/B near 2.1x–2.4x and a rough EV/EBITDA of about 7–9x. For a business that grew net profit near 100% a year at 29% ROE, that is undemanding in isolation — for context, the source notes JEC asked 53–62x. As analysis, the discount is the market pricing the stack of risks: cyclicality, rising leverage, customer concentration, related-party governance, and the no-MTO control transfer. Two methodology caveats carry through: any peer comparison should be benchmarked against live multiples of TOWR, SUPR, and listed genset/EPC peers rather than stale figures, and because BACH will increasingly be valued on Hartono-ecosystem captive demand, TOWR's own capex trajectory is the leading indicator to watch. On the proceeds, this reads as a genuine growth-capital IPO: even at the floor price, the majority (63%, rising to 70.4% at the ceiling) buys revenue-generating genset inventory and rental fleet, with the balance repaying the Bank Permata revolver — more investor-friendly than a deleveraging-heavy deal, though the "growth" is still more inventory in a capital-intensive, supplier-dependent model at trading-business margins.
Bottom line
BACH is two deals in one wrapper: a cheaply-priced, fast-growing genset/infra business raising real growth capital, and a control monetisation in which the Bach family sells command of the company to the Hartono group at a price the IPO book itself sets — with no tender offer for minorities and a sidecar 15.06% float. The bull case is concrete: ~10–13x earnings for ~100% profit growth and 29% ROE, a deep-pocketed strategic controller, captive demand from the Hartono tower ecosystem, growth-oriented use of proceeds, positive operating cash flow, a clean legal record, and a structural electrification tailwind. The bear case is equally concrete: a control transfer engineered around the MTO rules, related-party revenue overseen by a conflicted chair, debt-funded growth on a razor-thin cash base, dependence on Chinese genset supply, a cyclical demand engine, and a concentrated register where minority influence is minimal. The cheapness is real, but so is the reason for it — this is a bet that the Hartono group runs BACH for all shareholders rather than as a captive vendor, and the unresolved option strike price is the first datapoint that will reveal which way that goes.
Independent forensic analysis of preliminary prospectuses (Prospektus Awal), for educational purposes only. Not financial advice and not a recommendation to subscribe, buy, or sell. Figures are drawn from draft documents and may change in the final prospectus; opinions are analysis attributed to those documents. Always do your own research and consult a licensed advisor before investing.