IDX e-IPO Analytics

Thesis

INACO is a genuine 35-year-old consumer brand executing a margin-led profit turnaround while its top line shrinks for a second consecutive year — and it is asking the market to pay a demanding price for that story. PT Niramas Utama (JELI) is raising up to Rp392.0 bn in a 100%-primary offer (Rp900–Rp1,120 range), valuing the company at roughly 31–39× trailing parent earnings post-money. The bull case rests on a credible new export/OEM growth vector; the bear case is that 2025's profit surge rode a commodity tailwind, more than half the cash leaves the listed entity, and there is no hard lock-up on the 74% founder block. Strong brand, weak top line, rich price, several governance and structuring items to scrutinise.

How the business works

JELI is an own-brand FMCG manufacturer built on coconut and natural-fibre desserts — nata de coco, mini jelly, pudding, aloe vera, ready-to-drink lines (I'm Coco, Jelly Drink) and gummies — sold under the INACO label ("Indonesia Nata De Coco"). The company describes itself as pioneer and market leader in the nata de coco category; note that the prospectus offers no quantified market-share data, so the "market leader" claim is the issuer's own characterisation rather than a verified fact (independent media support brand strength, not a confirmed #1 ranking). The economics combine four owned plants (~3.5 billion units/year of stated capacity), a 251-point national distribution network, exports to 30+ countries, and a meaningful contract-manufacturing (OEM/maklon) book — most notably toll-manufacturing for the gummy brand Yupi (contract expiring September 2026, a renewal to watch) and a new agreement signed 28 October 2025 under which subsidiary NPS will manufacture jelly products for Japan's Tarami via trading house Kawasho, with the machinery supplied by the Japanese side. That Tarami/Kawasho deal is the strategic anchor behind both the capacity expansion and the export thesis.

The offering & ownership

This is a clean primary raise — 350,000,000 new shares (25.93% of post-IPO capital), no selling shareholders, no insider cash-out, underwritten on a full-commitment basis by sole lead PT Sucor Sekuritas. The crucial structural feature sits in the lock-up. Under POJK 25/2017 a lock-up only binds shareholders who acquired shares below the IPO price within six months before registration; the prospectus asserts no such party exists because the founder shares trace to a 2019 debt-to-equity conversion at par. The consequence is that there is no statutory lock-up on the 1,000,000,000 founder shares (74.07%). The only restraint is a voluntary 31 March 2026 pledge by UBO Ham Pak Japyusuf Hamdani not to relinquish control for at least 12 months — which, critically, is not a promise not to sell. He could sell down from 73.92% toward just above 50% and still honour the pledge. That gap between "registered float" and what can actually reach the tape is why the prospectus itself names share illiquidity as the primary investment risk.

Governance & related parties

The board is tightly family- and insider-overlapped: five of the six NUI minority holders also sit on JELI's board, and NUI's own Komisaris Utama is family (Sadikun Wiratno). Minority protection rests on a single Independent Commissioner, Prof. Dr. Rycko Amelza Dahniel — factually a retired three-star police general (Komjen Pol) and former head of BNPT. This is legal and common in Indonesian IPOs, but a lone politically-exposed independent commissioner offers limited genuine minority-shareholder protection; it is worth noting neutrally for governance optics. On related parties, the controlling family has historically lent to the group; those loans (Rp21.25 bn at year-end 2025, due 2030) had their interest re-priced from ~1.0%/month to 0.58%/month effective 9 January 2026 — just before registration, a cosmetic positive that flatters reported 2025 finance costs and profit.

Reading the financials

This is a textbook shrink-to-grow-margin story and it must be read carefully. Revenue declined 4.49% in 2025 to Rp753.1 bn — the second straight contraction (down 6.02% the year before) — yet net profit tripled to Rp39.0 bn. The driver was margin, not volume: management deliberately pruned low-margin SKUs while COGS fell faster on a cyclical raw-material (sugar/glucose/gelatin) price tailwind, supplier renegotiation, factory and labour efficiency, and end-2024 price increases. Disregard the "+54%" revenue figure some media reported — it is wrong; the audited numbers show a decline.

The signature red flag is cash. Despite tripling profit, 2025 operating cash flow collapsed from Rp123.5 bn to Rp20.5 bn (CFO/net profit of just 0.53×), as cash collected from customers fell roughly Rp70 bn below booked revenue. The receivables build is most plausibly a genuine seasonal timing effect — the pre-Ramadan 2026 peak was pulled forward into November–December 2025 and remained uncollected at year-end, with the bulk of receivables still not due and customers being blue-chip retail — but it depressed cash conversion heavily, and Q1-2026 normalisation is unconfirmed. Two further cautions: 2025 incorporates the SNU common-control acquisition (restated retrospectively), so the three-year series is not fully like-for-like; and the headline 26.8% ROE sits on a thin equity base that will roughly triple post-money, dropping prospective ROE toward 7–8%.

Valuation

The reasoning here is straightforward and uncomfortable. On an absolute basis, ~31–39× trailing P/E is a demanding multiple to pay for a company whose top line has shrunk two years running and whose margin spike rides a reversible commodity tailwind. The bull case must assume the gummy/jelly plus Tarami export expansion reignites top-line growth and that 2025 margins are structural rather than cyclical; if margins normalise toward 2024 levels while revenue stays flat-to-down, the price looks expensive. A relative "premium vs. peers" judgement is deferred — that requires live IDX processed-food multiples as of publication, and several outlets have characterised the pricing as premium without an independently verified comparison. It is also worth weighing what the proceeds buy: over half the raise is injected into 99.99%-owned subsidiary NPS to fund capacity expansion (largely imported European machinery still "in negotiation"), meaning the public funds capex one level down, demand-contingent on the Tarami contract, with FX exposure on the equipment.

Bottom line

JELI pairs a real, durable brand and a credible new export vector with a genuinely awkward financial profile: a shrinking top line, a margin surge that may be peak-cyclical, a 2025 cash-conversion break, and an aggressive price. The 100% primary structure and clean legal and audit standing are points in its favour, and the deleveraging from the raise is material. But the absence of a hard lock-up on 74% of shares, the down-streaming of most proceeds into a family-controlled subsidiary for not-yet-contracted machinery, and the demanding multiple on declining revenue leave little margin of safety. This is a brand worth respecting and a price worth questioning — one to underwrite only if you believe the export-led growth reignites and the 2025 margins hold.